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Abstract 
This chapter addresses new technologies of surveillance in secondary schools, and the 
implications of such surveillance for race equality, providing new insights into seldom 
discussed relations of power and education. The ‘war on terror’ has led to new 
regimes of control involving the limiting of personal freedoms and constant 
surveillance, in response to the perceived risk of terrorist attacks.  In this paper I argue 
the counter-terrorism agenda is one reason schools have invested in new technologies 
of surveillance and explore the implications of such surveillance for the way in which 
students are raced. I apply a framework combining Critical Race Theory with Judith 
Butler’s thinking on recognisable lives and Agamben’s (2005) state of exception, to 
analyse how minority ethnic young people are constructed as ‘threatening’.  
 
The ‘war on terror’ and surveillance 
Since September 11th 2001, and the London bombings of July 2005, the ‘war on 
terror’ has led to the subjection of populations to new regimes of control and reinforced state 
sovereignty.  This involves, in countries such as the UK and the US, the limiting of personal 
freedoms, increased regulation of immigration and constant surveillance, as a response to the 
perceived increased risk of terrorist attacks.  In this paper I argue that the counter-terrorism 
agenda is one of the reasons schools have invested to such an extent in new technologies of 
surveillance, and explore the implications such surveillance has for the way in which students 
are raced.  
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Recent years have seen an explosive expansion of new technologies of surveillance 
installed not just in the wider community, but also in UK secondary schools. Although there 
has been much discussion devoted to these new technologies and their impact in general, as 
an educational phenomenon, surveillance in schools is only just beginning to receive media 
and academic attention (for example, Hope, 2009; McCahill and Finn, 2010; Taylor, 2013).  
Schools have installed Closed Circuit television cameras (CCTV), metal detectors, alcohol 
and drug testing, chipped identity cards and electronic registers, biometric tools such as iris 
and finger print recognition, and cyberspace surveillance including webcams and websites 
hosting student data for parental access, among others (Hope, 2009). There have been reports 
of systems to log what a pupil chooses for lunch so parents can check their child’s diet (UK 
Press Association, 2009) and of CCTV cameras being installed in school toilets (Chadderton, 
2009). 
The installation of surveillance devices tends to be justified on grounds of security 
(see for example Marx and Steeves, 2010). Protection from both external and internal threat 
of ‘dangerous others’ provide the ostensible impetus for the installation of CCTV in schools 
in the UK, for example, after the stabbing of head teacher Phillip Lawrence at his school gate 
in 1995 and the massacre in a Dunblane Primary School in 1996 in which an outsider shot 
and killed 16 children and their teacher, fears around allegedly increasing knife crime, and 
also school and college shootings in the US such as Columbine (2001) or Virginia Tech 
(2007).  Reasons of health and personal safety are also cited for the introduction of these new 
technologies, including the reduction of bullying, theft, smoking, junk food consumption and 
truancy.  
However, there is much evidence to suggest that surveillance systems do not ensure 
security – indeed there was both an armed guard and video surveillance system at Columbine. 
This begs the question why there has been such an increase in new surveillance technologies 
in recent years.  There are of course, as with any phenomenon, many reasons, which are 
inevitably interconnected. These include a ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi, 2005), and a commercial 
enterprise for security device businesses (Casella, 2010).  Alternatively as Ragnedda (2010) 
argues,  
 
[s]urveillance is much more than simply monitoring, watching and recording 
individuals and their data.  […] Surveillance is an interaction of power that creates 
and advances relations of domination. In practice, surveillance is a mode of 
governance, one that controls access and opportunities. (p. 356) 
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 There is therefore more to surveillance regimes than monitoring and security.  
 It should be emphasised that there is still a real lack of empirical data on new 
technologies of surveillance in schools in the UK, and what there is has not focussed on race 
(see e.g. Taylor, 2013).  My arguments in this paper therefore, are based on small studies, 
newspaper reports and other, relevant literature, mostly from the US.  There is no data, for 
example, on what is done with the CCTV tapes, who watches them, nor whether they are 
watched at all. There is no data on whether the students or teachers perceive there to be a race 
aspect to the surveillance. I have submitted two applications for funding for large projects 
which would explore these issues in more depth, but both have been turned down.  Taylor 
(2013) has conducted a rare empirical study of the perspectives of both students and staff 
from three secondary schools in northern England.  She draws our attention to the lack of 
legal regulation around what she terms surveillance schools, pointing out that, for example, in 
the UK, the Data Protection Act 1998 is ‘inappropriate in a school setting. Head teachers are 
vested with the autonomy to implement any technology they desire, and they are not legally 
obliged to gain the consent of the parents, or even inform them’ (p.100). 
 
Reading the work of Judith Butler through the lens of Critical Race Theory 
In this article I use insights from Critical Race Theory (CRT) as well as the work of 
Judith Butler (2004a, b, 2010) to consider the possible racial implications of the extensive use 
of new technologies of surveillance in UK secondary schools.  Whilst acknowledging that 
there are tensions in combining CRT – generally considered a structuralist approach – and the 
work of Judith Butler – generally located in the poststructuralist tradition although more 
recently shifting towards a more critical perspective - I argue that using insights from both 
allows us a more in-depth study of the production of race and racial identities and the 
implications of this for policy making in the UK (see Chadderton, 2013). I draw parallels 
between the two theories in order to consider the way in which some lives are recognised as 
fully human lives, and others are not.  
CRT provides an explicit structural framework for investigating racism and the way 
racism operates. It considers all institutional and social arrangements to be based on the 
interests of those politically designated ‘white’, which is referred to as a system of white 
supremacy. White supremacy in this context does not refer specifically to extreme forms of 
oppression such as slavery or apartheid, nor to the actions of white right-wing extremists 
(although these are also taken seriously), but to a system of everyday oppression and 
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exploitation which benefits the interests of whites as a political collective (Allen, 2001).  In 
my reading of CRT, race does not replace class as a determiner of educational experience, 
the more traditional unit of analysis in the UK, rather it foregrounds race as a key determiner, 
and some situations cannot be explained without an understanding of race.  
The term white supremacy does not necessarily refer to skin colour, rather to 
structures of subordination and domination, something which tends to be misunderstood by 
CRT’s critics (for example Cole, 2009).  Despite the official acknowledgement of structural 
and possibly unwitting racism in the term ‘institutional racism’, which identified covert 
racism in the police force in 1999, racism in the UK still tends to be understood in terms of 
extreme, violent acts, or the openly racist rhetoric of the British National Party or Neo-Nazi 
groups (Moschel, 2007). This structural framework is thus very useful as an analytical tool 
for understanding covert racism.  Importantly, critical race theorists argue that white 
supremacy is a system so deeply engrained in western cultures that it frequently goes 
unnoticed, perceived simply as normal or natural (Ladson-Billings, 1998). The question in 
this analysis is not whether white supremacy can be identified, but how it is manifested.   
As my own racial positioning is ‘so-called white’ I do not pretend that my use of CRT 
is not to some extent problematic.  However, I engage with CRT as a theory and analytical 
tool whilst explicitly rejecting those tendencies in whiteness studies for whites to dwell self-
indulgently on their own whiteness, hoping that in some way this piece, even coming from a 
white author, has some legitimacy, operating both within and against whiteness (Ignatiev, 
1997).   
Critical Race Theorists have examined the role of the war on terror in shaping racial 
discourses and racial oppression.  Ladson-Billings (2003) explores the way in which since the 
attack on September 11th, 2001 (‘9/11’), discourses around US identities have become 
polarised into those who are with the US, and those who are against.  Oztas (2011) argues 
that there has been a similar response in the UK, rendered more potent through the London 
bombings on 7th July 2005 (‘7/7’). The population is perceived as split into two groups: a 
group which is to be protected from threat, and a group which is threatening (Oztas, 2011).  
In this case the ‘allegedly suspect’ terrorists are Muslims, pre-defined as belonging to a 
culture which does not share the values of the west.  This builds on longstanding discourses 
of Islam as an under developed culture which condones, even encourages violence. Oztas 
argues that the image of Muslims in the UK is also confused with notions of a visible 
immigrant, the Other who threatens the west with a presumed lack of civilised values. The 
notion of terrorism is perceived as essentially linked to this ‘incompatibility’ with western 
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life, which in effect implicates all Muslims. Thus links with violence and threat are seen as 
integral to Islam, and by association, to all Muslims.  As Ladson-Billings (2003) argues, the 
division of populations in this way has implications for who can be considered a citizen of a 
given nation, and who, by implication, cannot.  
In this article, I read the work of Judith Butler through a CRT lens. Her work is useful 
for scholars exploring the way in which subjectivities are constituted, allowing a critical, in-
depth study of the way in which identities are produced and re-produced through political 
frames which tend to favour white-western, male and middle class identities. While dealing 
with inequalities, her work tends to be associated with gender discrimination rather than race.  
However, her more recent work does have a racial focus, dealing with the way in which 
‘recognisability’ as a human is racially framed, and the implications this has for counter-
terrorism measures (Butler, 2004a, 2010).   
For Butler, identity categories do not reflect essential or innate subjectivities. Rather, 
identities are discursively constituted, by which is meant is that all identities are actually 
produced, by discourse.  Butler’s recent work considers the way lives are divided into those 
which are fully ‘recognisable’ as human, and those which are not.  By recognisable, she 
means conceivable as lives on an equal level as other lives: 
 
The terms by which we are recognised as human are socially articulated and 
changeable.  And sometimes the very terms that confer ‘humanness’ on some 
individuals are those that deprive certain other individuals of the possibility of 
achieving that status, producing a differential between the human and the less-than-
human.  These norms have far-reaching consequences for how we understand the 
model of the human entitled to rights or included in the participatory sphere of 
political deliberation.  The human is understood differently depending on its race, the 
legibility of that race, its morphology, the legibility of that morphology, its sex, the 
perceptual verifiability of that sex, its ethnicity, the categorical understanding of that 
ethnicity.  Certain humans are recognised as less than human. (Butler 2004b:2) 
 
Thus lives and bodies are understood, ‘recognised’, according to social norms, and will have 
different entitlements to rights.  Those with fewer rights, she argues, will be recognised as 
‘less-than-human’.  These lives which do not fully count as lives, are, on the contrary, 
regarded as a threat to life.  This therefore justifies a defence, in cases where recognisable 
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lives are perceived to be under threat. Lives, then, in a Butlerian framework, are produced 
through specific mechanisms of power, 
 
These categories, conventions and norms that prepare or establish a subject for 
recognition [...] precede and make possible the act of recognition itself.  In this sense, 
recognisability precedes recognition. (Butler, 2010: 5) 
 
As the discourses which constitute the subject pre-exist the subject, an individual 
subject is perceived as the embodiment of the discourse. This is very relevant for the 
differentiation of bodies through the counter-terrorism agenda.  Racial frames ‘differentiate 
[…] in advance who will count as a life, and who will not’ (Butler, 2010: xxix). A ‘frame’ in 
Butlerian terms, is a collection of discourses which shapes perception. Contrary to early 
critiques of Butler’s work, she argues that these frames, whilst discursive, are not ‘merely’ 
perceptual or cultural: they have material effects on real lives and interaction (see for 
example, Butler, 1998). I use the notion of material here, not in the historical Marxist sense, 
but in a critical realist sense, to refer to the ‘real’. Butler, particularly her more recent work 
which has shifted away from what could be termed a more extreme poststructuralist stance, 
can be read materially through the use of ‘frames’ of reference and CRT can be read through 
a Butlerian-materialist frame.   
In this way, Butler’s work has parallels with CRT.  Perceived racial heritage defines 
whether an individual belongs to the group which threatens the west, or that which is under 
threat. As Ladson-Billings (2003) argues, those who are perceived as a threat are viewed 
simplistically as evil and irrational and even non-human. Oztas (2011) argues that those of 
(perceived) Arab, North African or Middle Eastern heritage find themselves outside the law, 
as it is individuals from these groups whose citizenship rights are most likely to be suspended 
both under English (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Civil Contingencies Act 2004) and 
US law (USA Patriot Act 2001).  These racial groups, then, have become the (imagined, 
nevertheless, with real consequences) embodiment of threat.  In being beyond the law, their 
position as (perceived) non-human is reified- without the rights of a citizen, it could be 
argued they are rendered a non-human subject.  Thus in counter-terrorism discourses, 
(perceived) racial groups who are likely to be Muslims are recognised (in Butlerian terms) as 
non-human.  
There are further similarities between Butler’s work and CRT. Some critiques of CRT 
consider that, despite its emphasis on racial formation, it is essentialist and ‘…the 
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essentialism inherent in the original epistemological intent of “race” is preserved’ (Darder 
and Torres, 2004).  Hill (2009) has argued that the concept of white supremacy is ‘too blunt’ 
(p3).  However, the potential instability of the fixidity of race to bodies presumed by Butler 
is, it could be argued, inherent in understanding the ways in which CRT comprehends the 
significance of white supremacy in making oppressive racial identifications.  The fixidity of 
race requires the everyday and ongoing exercise of white supremacy.  Theorising white 
supremacy is therefore necessary to understanding how race is not only recognised as 
embodied but also how this constitutes, and is constituted by, a form of power.  Ignatiev 
(1995), for example, demonstrates how the Irish in the US have not always been considered 
white, rather they actually chose to become white.  White supremacy, understood through a 
Butlerian lens, is therefore a fluid notion and historically located. 
 
The return to sovereignty and the ‘state of exception’ 
Butler (2004a) has argued that the “war on terror” and its implications for citizens in 
western democracies is illustrative of a return from what Foucault termed governmentality – 
a system of governmental control in which power is de-centred and exerted by shaping the 
behaviour, attitudes and subjectivities of citizens in order to effect self-regulation – towards 
sovereignty and the more overt exercise of state power.   Importantly, she argues that 
sovereignty was never completely replaced by governmentality, rather, it could be 
reintroduced by those in positions of power whenever they felt it necessary. She links this 
shift to sovereignty to the notion of the “state of exception”, based on the work of Agamben 
(1998, 2005) who argues that western democracies have reintroduced a permanent state of 
exception, in which the so-called democratic state can suspend laws and engage in actions for 
which public consent is not sought.  Agamben uses the situation of the Jewish people under 
the Nazis to exemplify the state of exception, suggesting that the Nazi terror was not 
necessarily exceptional, rather, an extreme form of sovereignty which can be reintroduced in 
a democracy by the powerful at any time. Whenever they choose, he argues, the powerful can 
reduce groups of citizens to what he refers as bare life, or mere physical existence, thus 
exercising sovereignty and removing from these groups the protection of law.  He equates 
these dispossessed groups to the homo sacer, a paradoxical figure from Roman Law, who 
may not be used for sacrifice, but may be killed by anyone without this being considered a 
crime. This paradox illustrates the dual nature of the homo sacer: this is a figure, who does 
not enjoy the rights of a citizen, and therefore may not live a political life, yet s/he leads a life 
defined by politics. Colatrella (2011) argues that Agamben exaggerates our present situation, 
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which cannot be compared to that of the Holocaust. However, it is perhaps worth recognising 
that there are common features: Butler (2004a) takes up the notion of the state of exception to 
consider the implications of the war on terror for western democracies, in particular the US. 
She argues that an indefinite, all-pervasive ‘state of emergency’ has been introduced in which 
laws can be suspended at the will of those in power, giving as an example the indefinite 
detention of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, suggesting that such measures are ‘the means 
by which the exceptional becomes established as a naturalised norm’ (p.67).  As Douglas 
(2009: 37) argues ‘in the state of exception, what needs to be emphasised is that it is not a 
power relation of pure violence, but rather, of potential violence.’ 
Butler argues that there is a racial frame through which certain groups are viewed 
such that they are deemed less than human, a condition she equates with the homo sacer- a 
group who are deprived of their rights as citizens, it is this condition which can be seen as a 
power relation of potential violence. In the case of the war on terror, the frame through which 
the less than human are viewed is Islam.  Like the critical race theorists cited above, Butler 
argues that Islam is regarded as beyond the hegemonic norms of the West, which positions 
Muslims as suspicious or threatening.  It is the fact that all Muslims, or those taken to be 
Muslim, Arabs, or Middle Eastern are viewed through a racial frame defining them as 
threatening and non-western, which means that these citizens are considered to embody the 
threat of terror, which they are seen to carry as an essential part of their subjectivity, and 
which therefore allows them to be ‘recognised’ as non-citizens. As non-citizens, they do not 
enjoy the same entitlement to rights as citizens, and deprived of legal protection, Muslims 
become recognised as ‘humans who are not humans’, or the potential homo sacer.  As such, 
sovereignty differentiates between humans on grounds of (perceived) race and ethnicity. Thus 
Butler (2004a) argues that managing a population does not only produce subjects, ‘it is also 
the process of their de-subjectivation, one with enormous political and legal consequences’ 
(p.98). This process is justified to the population, where justification is required, on grounds 
of the necessity of a ‘state of emergency’, requiring sometimes extreme political responses to 
the alleged terrorist threat. 
 
Linking school surveillance, counter-terrorism and race 
Some might argue that the link between surveillance in schools and the counter-
terrorism agenda is quite tenuous.  However, research has shown that the counter-terrorism 
agenda is changing the face of our cities in particular, creating new borders, restrictions and 
regulations (see for example Coaffee and Rogers, 2008).  The link between school 
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surveillance and counter-terrorism in the UK has been made explicit through government 
policy and documentation allocating education staff a role in monitoring extremism: The 
Prevent strategy (re-launched 2011) and The Channel Project both aim to prevent young 
people from becoming radicalised (Home Office, 2011).  Although counter-terrorism agendas 
in the last decade have focused on various groups and ideologies, including the far right, 
animal rights groups, student protestors, anarchists, Irish nationalists and Islamic extremism, 
the present UK government has focused primarily on the Islamic threat, stating on the 
Prevent website, ‘[c]urrently, the greatest threat comes from Al Qa’ida, its affiliates and like-
minded groups’. The Department for Education and Schools (2005) produced guidance for 
schools after 7/7 focused on their capacity to tackle terrorism directly and called for teachers 
to be involved ‘more explicitly in national security issues than at any time in British history’ 
(Preston, 2009: 196). The Department for Children Schools and Families (2008) introduced 
an ‘extremism toolkit’ for schools, ‘Learning together to be safe: a toolkit to help schools 
contribute to the prevention of violent extremism’, also tying schools into surveillance and 
counter-terrorism agendas. Higher Education providers are expected to engage with Special 
Branch (a unit of the British police responsible for national security and criminal intelligence) 
to monitor students for signs of radicalism. In the US, in the wake of 9/11 and the Beslan 
school hostage crisis in which Chechan Islamic militants took 1100 people hostage at a North 
Ossetia school, the Department of Homeland Security made grants available for the purchase 
of security systems in schools (Casella, 2006, in Monahan and Torres, 2010: 4).   
Of course schools have long engaged in surveillance practices such as physical 
observation, attendance registers, dress codes and behaviour policies, exams, tests and 
publishing of League Tables (cf. Foucault, 1991). However, more recently, school children 
are subject to much more rigid regimes – indeed, some would argue they are criminalised by 
such practices (Giroux, 2009).  Any deviations from the norm are punished very severely: 
levels of exclusion from secondary schools have risen to unprecedented levels in the UK, and 
schools more frequently resort to punishments involving the police for misdemeanours which 
would previously have been dealt with by staff, parents and governors. We have also seen the 
introduction of on-site police officers (more common in the US, but still present at least part-
time in some, particularly inner-city UK schools), the presence of whom, it could be argued, 
links the school and criminal justice system.  Although it would be unrealistic to argue that 
the only reason for these shifts towards more rigid regimes of control is the war on terror, as 
we can see from the policies mentioned above, and following Judith Butler, it makes sense to 
assume that the counter-terror agenda is impacting on and feeding into education policy.   
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It is often presumed that surveillance is neutral and ‘democratic’, that is, it affects all 
sectors of society equally, as we are all under surveillance (Monahan and Torres, 2010).  
Normally, the work of Foucault and his writing on the panopticon are used when theorising 
surveillance.  Foucault’s work certainly allows us to understand how the modern, western 
world is governed by biopolitical power which functions by disciplining subjects so they 
internalise the discipline and creating ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 1991). However, Foucault 
did not differentiate between these docile bodies in terms of race.  Viewed through a CRT 
lens however, surveillance cannot be considered racially neutral. The racial aspect of new 
technologies of school surveillance has rarely been made explicit. A small amount of work 
has been done in the US (Monahan and Torres, 2010; Simmons, 2010), but nothing in the 
UK.  A recent project on the ‘surveilled’ (McCahill and Finn, 2010) examined the social 
impact of new surveillance technologies on the lives of school children living in a Northern 
English city, including looking at 13 to 16 year-old children in three schools.  It found that 
children’s experiences differed across social class and gender, but did not examine the 
implications for race.  Recent work on surveillance in general has identified ‘social sorting’ 
(see Lyon, 2003) which ‘indicates the tendency for surveillance systems to operate as 
mechanisms for societal differentiation’ (Monahan and Fisher, 2008: 219). Therefore existing 
inequalities are likely to be reproduced by surveillance regimes (Monahan and Fisher, 2008; 
Simmons, 2010).  
As we have seen, the counter-terror agenda is shaped by a racial frame. Since the 
discourses which shape the frame tend to be implicit rather than explicit, I draw on CRT to 
render the racial aspects of school surveillance visible.  In the counter-terrorism context, as I 
argue above, racial minorities, particularly those who are perceived to be Muslims, are 
already positioned as embodying threat and thus in need of control and surveillance. Minority 
ethnic individuals are already disproportionately subjected to more surveillance outside 
school, such as police ‘stop and search’ practices on the streets, airport controls and police 
profiling ‘which continue to rely upon racial markers of “risk”’ (Monahan and Fisher, 2008: 
217).  Black, Asian or Minority Ethnic groups (BAME) are seven times more likely to be 
stopped and searched than white people. The number of arrests for the white group decreased 
during 2010-11, however arrests of Black persons rose by 5 per cent and arrests of Asian 
people by 13 per cent. 26 per cent of the prison population comes from BAME groups. In 
2010, the highest average custodial sentence length (ACSL) for those given determinate 
sentences for indictable offences was recorded for the Black ethnic group, at 20.8 months, 
followed by the Asian and Other groups with averages of 19.9 months and 19.7 months 
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respectively. The lowest ACSL was recorded for the white group at 14.9 months (all data 
Justice, 2011). Equally, in a school context, research has shown that minority ethnic young 
people are more likely to be excluded from school than white young people (Gillborn, 2006).  
It has been suggested that one reason for this is the perception of teachers, many of whom 
view minority ethnic children as a challenge or threat, their perceptions shaped by dominant 
discourses (for example, Gillborn, 1990; Mirza, 1992; Basit, 1997). 
As yet there is a lack of empirical research linking new technologies of surveillance in 
schools and race, and we can only assume the impact on young people’s subjectivities and 
racial inequalities. Other research has argued that those who are perceived to be in need of 
surveillance are positioned as suspects (Monahan and Torres, 2010).  McCahill and Finn 
(2010) suggested that the females in their study were more acutely aware of being under 
surveillance because women’s bodies already tend to be more scrutinised than men’s.  As 
racial minorities are already frequently positioned as threatening or suspects, and are already 
more scrutinised than whites, it makes sense to assume that school surveillance is likely to 
impact more harshly on racial minorities than their white counterparts, and these discourses 
are likely to build on longstanding notions of perceived essentialised links between minority 
ethnic bodies and criminality and threat (Oztas, 2011).  Research on surveillance technologies 
in general has pointed to the importance of the interpretation of the body in the way in which 
surveillance devices are employed.  In his study of young working class males, Nayak (2006: 
64) showed how they are excluded from clubs and bars because of their dress and the way 
they move.  Equally a study by Norris and Armstrong showed that ‘[t]hose responsible for 
operating open-street CCTV surveillance cameras use them to target young working class 
males who have their “head up, back straight, upper body moving too much”, or those who 
were “swaggering, looking hard”’ (Norris and Armstrong 1999: 122, cited in McCahill and 
Finn, 2010: 286). These examples suggest that the way in which different bodies and their 
behaviours are ‘recognised’ (in Butlerian terms) is dependent on dominant discourses of race, 
class and gender.  It therefore seems likely that new technologies of surveillance will regulate 
and control bodies accordingly, and that the existing raced dynamic in schools will be 
reinforced by increased surveillance. 
 
Reproducing white supremacy and the homo sacer 
A CRT analysis of schooling allows us to theorise the links between school 
surveillance, counter-terrorism and race and see schools as sites where the counter-terrorism 
agenda will be played out.  Critical race theorists have extended the analysis of others (for 
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example Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; Durkheim, 1956) to argue that not only does formal 
education have a specific function to teach loyalty to the state and to ensure the maintenance 
of the social status quo, it ensures the maintenance of white supremacy (Ladson-Billings, 
1998; Gillborn, 2006).  Thus we see that white supremacy is not a fixed structure, rather it 
requires continual maintenance work, to which this new surveillance regime potentially 
contributes.  Following Butler, it can be argued that through the framing of specific bodies as 
threat, these bodies become a legitimate target.  Taking the example of photography, she 
writes that photographs both allocate positions to those on camera, the target, and those 
behind the camera, the viewer, and remove the wider context in which these photographs are 
taken, playing a key role in producing the subject, 
 
cameras [...] both frame and form the human and non-human target [...] In a way,  that 
focussing on the target produces a position for the soldier, the reporter, and the public 
audience, structuring the visual field that makes each position possible.  The frame 
not only orchestrates such positions, but also delimits the visual field itself. (Butler, 
2010: x-xi) 
 
Surveillance can be seen as creating a similar process: the fact that bodies already 
‘recognised’ as threat are under surveillance, actually reproduces their subject position as 
threat.  In the context of the war on terror, Muslim lives are not fully recognisable as lives, 
but rather are viewed as threat to life.  They are, indeed, already recognised as a terrorist 
threat, and as ‘recognisability precedes recognition’ (Butler, 2010:5), increased surveillance 
and monitoring will ensure that young people who are Muslims are the embodiment of the 
threat.  As Butler explains, this ‘recognition’ of threat further justifies the increase in 
surveillance. 
 
Once Muslim citizens are recognised as a threat to life, and their surveillance is 
justified, they become the less-than-human, as they are recognised as the embodiment of the 
threat to Britishness, and therefore they are vulnerable to the potential violence of the 
position of non-citizen, non-human, whose entitlement to rights is very much reduced – 
potentially the homo sacer.  For a group already frequently positioned as unbritish, as 
explained above, Muslims, or those perceived as Muslims, their vulnerability is only 
compounded. 
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 When a population appears as a direct threat to my life, they do not appear as ‘lives’, 
 but as the threat to life (a living figure that figures the threat to life).  Consider how 
 this is compounded under those conditions in which Islam is seen as barbaric or pre-
 modern, as not yet having conformed to those norms that make the human 
 recognisable. (Butler, 2010: 42) 
 
Moreover, those bodies which are caught in the background of the CCTV images, 
those which are not understood to be directly under surveillance, are reconfirmed in their 
‘innocence’- indeed, recognised as full lives – in this case, those whose lives are perceived as 
under threat, the white British. Thus surveillance is actively producing those divided 
populations identified by critical race theorists.  The CCTV camera, then, creates and re-
creates the frame, ‘[t]he frame does not simply exhibit reality, but actively participates in a 
strategy of containment, selectively producing and enforcing what will count as reality’ 
(Butler, 2010: xiii).  Also we can observe at a micro-level the process of desubjectivation 
identified by Butler, in which a group of citizens, Muslims, already defined as threat, come to 
be recognised as the non-citizen, described as the less-than-human or the homo sacer, as the 
group whose perceived need for surveillance justifies their continued and increased 
surveillance, which in turn reproduces their subject position as beyond human, or indeed, de-
subjectivates.   
Drawing on both Judith Butler and CRT, then, I argue that the surveillance and 
monitoring procedures for allegedly ensuring the security of young people at school in the 
UK are actually reproducing structures of white supremacy and both the discourse and the 
materiality of race.  The installation of new surveillance technologies can be seen, at least 
partly, as a response to counter-terrorism discourses, and in addition, feed into and re-produce 
these discourses.  Surveillance procedures actually produce the recognisability of white 
bodies as lives, and minority ethnic bodies as threat, therefore maintaining the structures of 
white supremacy.  As subjectivities are seen as discursively constituted, this is likely to have 
a very real effect on the way in which young people are perceived and perceive themselves. 
Moreover, whilst the process may not yet be complete, it could be argued that the 
state of exception is creeping into the liberal democracy of the UK.  The state of exception, 
then, is characterized by the suspension of ‘normal’ law to protect the interest of the 
sovereign, and the removal from the political realm of a specific group, which is treated as 
bare life, in that must be ‘constantly monitored and exposed to the potentiality of violence’ 
(Douglas, 2009:33).  It cannot be overlooked that the demands on educational institutions to 
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monitor young people are made in the wider context of provisions for the temporary 
suspension of citizenship rights.  These laws, as Douglas argues, ‘essentially nullify the 
application of normal laws protecting human rights, while still holding them technically “in 
force”’ (Douglas, 2009:33).  It is these ‘exceptional’ laws which justify the increased 
surveillance, and it is in this way that the state of exception is becoming ‘normal’.  Douglas 
(2009) argues that 
  
[m]aking people suspects is equivalent to making people bare life [...] Electronic and 
biometric surveillance are the tactics through which the government is creating a 
space in which the exception is routine practice. The biopolitical implication of 
surveillance is the universalization of bare life: ‘History teaches us how practices first 
reserved for foreigners find themselves applied later to the rest of the citizenry’ 
(Agamben, 2004). These new control measures have created a situation in which not 
only is there no clear distinction between private and political life, but there is no 
fundamental claim, or right, to a political life as such – not even for citizens from 
birth; thus, the originary biopolitical act that inscribes life as political from birth is 
more and more a potential depoliticization and ban from the political realm. (p. 37)  
 
Those young people ‘recognised’ as threatening in the counter-terrorism context fulfil the 
criteria of the homo sacer- they are constantly monitored, their rights to privacy suspended 
(Taylor, 2013), potentially vulnerable to the complete withdrawal of their citizenship rights, 
they are depoliticised whilst being hyperpolitically defined.  Therefore although to some the 
notion of an encroaching state of exception in democratic Europe may be extreme, if we take 
the example of new regimes and technologies of surveillance in many UK schools, it could be 
argued that many features of a permanent state of emergency, thus the state of exception, are 
increasingly defining our lives as extreme measures are resorted to in response to a perceived 
threat of terrorism. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that new regimes of surveillance in UK secondary schools 
are partially linked to the government’s counter-terrorism agenda, and have implications for 
the ways in which populations are divided along lines of race.  Using a framework which 
draws on both the work of critical race theorists and Judith Butler, I have shown how the war 
on terror is both fed by, and reinforces and reproduces an existing regime of white 
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supremacy.  I have also suggested that the war on terror has ushered in an era of increased 
sovereignty, the key to understanding how this regime of surveillance is justified: 
 
Sovereignty becomes that instrument of power by which law is either used tacitly or 
suspended, populations are monitored, detained, regulated, inspected, interrogated, 
rendered uniform in their actions, fully ritualised and exposed to control and 
regulation in their daily lives. (Butler, 2004a: 97). 
 
I have suggested that racial frames differentiate who will be ‘recognisable’ (in 
Butlerian terms) as human and less-than-human, and have equated this to Agamben’s (1998) 
notion of homo sacer and bare life, which, although it may seem extreme to some, seems to 
describe well the encroaching state of exception in the liberally democratic UK. Thus we see 
a shift from the decentred power of governmentality towards the more overt power of 
sovereignty in which existing laws can be suspended whist still being in effect, and certain 
groups are marginalised to the extent of being beyond the protection of law – in the case of 
the war on terror, it is Muslims or those who appear to be of Arab or Middle Eastern heritage 
who are ‘recognised’ as less-than-human.  
I conclude by calling for more empirical research on the extent, meaning, and 
implications of the explosion of new technologies of surveillance in UK schools, including 
further work which explores the perceptions and resistances of those implicated in this 
surveillance, as we cannot presume that young people are passive receivers of these regimes 
of surveillance (Hope, 2005).  Equally, my study illustrates that more research is needed on 
the implications of the counter-terrorism agenda for educational spaces, and the social 
consequences for young people and education of this shift to sovereignty and the 
encroachment of the state of exception.  
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